Political science is notoriously divided into subfields. In parallel, most journals are restricted to one or another part of the discipline and most faculty teach only within their specializations and have little time to read outside of it. We then tend to lose sight of the fact that all of us are studying politics of one form or another and so perspectives that span the divisions are particularly valuable.
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One that draws heavily on microeconomics is the conception of actors striving to reach common interests in the face of significant conflict and the fear that others will cheat on any agreement that might be reached. 1 The obvious model here is Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), in which actors who cannot make binding agreements are driven by the desire to take advantage of the adversary/partner and reinforced by the fear that if the actor does not do so the latter will. A frequent result is mutual defection, which is worse for both sides than mutual cooperation. Long seen as an underlying cause of strife in international politics, more recently scholars have looked to the PD to explore the conditions and policies that are most propitious for cooperation. 2 In parallel, students of domestic politics have come to argue that even within states bargains may not be readily enforceable. This is particularly true for relations within the legislative branch and between legislatures and executives: members of Congress are often in a PD with each other, as is the legislature as a whole in many dealings with the executive. At the same time, students of comparative politics have employed closely related approaches in analyzing how individuals and organizations can cooperate to avoid tragedies of the commons. 3 Although Pierson's focus on path dependence is quite different, it too has the great virtue of cutting across the subfields of political science and making connections with other fields, including sociology, parts of economics, and, most obviously, history. The stress on the importance of timing and sequences also makes a strong link to thinking about evolution: as Stephen Jay Gould argues, this perspective shares with Darwin a "central distinction between laws in the background and contingency in the details."
4 While we can understand the way events work themselves out through the system and the processes are regular and produce discernible patterns, small details greatly affect the course of development.
SYSTEMS AND INTERACTIONS
This argument can be set in a broader framework of systems of interconnected units which often display powerful feedbacks, operate in non-linear ways, produce outcomes that are difficult to trace (let alone to predict ahead of time), and involve dynamics that are not easily captured by our standard notions of cause and effect. 5 This perspective is nonreductionist in its premise that phenomena at one level cannot be understood in terms of the characteristics and activities of the units at a lower level. Thus, states are more than and different from the actions of the individuals and organizations that constitute them, and internation-al politics is different from the sum of the foreign policies of the states in the international system.
When we think in these terms it is easier to recognize that the systemic nature and overall impact of a set of policies may be quite different not only from their characteristics taken individually, but even from what would be expected by simple aggregation. Thus Cathy Lisa Schneider shows that although no specific component of the War on Drugs is racist, the combination of the incentives that they establish for police and drug users results in the arrest of a disproportionate number of African Americans. 6 Using interactions as the fundamental unit of analysis similarly alerts us to the fallacy of claims that one policy, treatment, or institution is best without taking account of how the effects are generated by several factors working together. To take a parochial example, common assertions that one college provides the best undergraduate education ignore the crucial role of the match between the institution and the individual, something that is often more apparent to students than to those who are paying their tuition.
More generally, interaction makes it difficult to determine the influence of a policy or organization whose effectiveness may vary with the mix of situations and inputs it confronts. To continue with the example of educational institutions, this problem complicates attempts to determine whether private schools do a better job than public ones. To deal with the problem that the two enroll different students, we could use an experimental design: from those public schools students who apply for openings in private or parochial institutions, a random sample should be admitted, allowing researchers to compare their performance with that of the students who were equally motivated but by chance had remained where they were. The inferences we can draw about the impact of the school are not so simple, however. Not only is it possible that being in what is perceived to be a more selective school would lead students to try harder, but if students are influenced by their peers we would expect those who join a higher achieving group to do better. If this is the case, improvement in the students' performance would not mean that public schools should adopt the techniques and teachers of the private ones. Thinking in terms of interactions and systems then sensitizes us to the difficulty in explaining the outcome by one factor, even one that has been experimentally changed.
Pierson's admirable essay is too brief to cover all the topics that can be encompassed by this approach. Because this is even more true of mine, I will take selected topics that overlap with those Pierson analyzed but that also cover slightly different territory. I will draw most of my examples from international politics because this is the area I know best and trust that readers will be able to call up suitable cases from their own fields of specialization.
INTERACTIONS AND EVOLUTION
We often speak of a policy, an actor, or an entire system evolving. Indeed, evolutionary theory is useful as more than a metaphor, but it needs to be thought of carefully. Most of us think that actors and policies become adapted to their environments. Those that fit badly will die or at least fail to thrive and reproduce. 7 But it is a misreading of evolutionary theory to see actors as conforming to a stable environment: coevolution is often at work as actors change their environments as they live in them. Thus while visitors to Africa who see elephants and cattle living in different settings are likely to infer that the animals have chosen and adapted to their physical habitats, in fact they have shaped them. Elephants thrive on acacia trees, but the latter can only develop in the absence of the former. After a while, the elephants destroy the trees, drastically changing the wildlife that the area can sustain and even affecting the physical landscape. In the process, they render the area uncongenial to them, and they either die or move on. The land is adapting to the elephants just as they are to it. One Maasai put it well: "Cows grow trees, elephants grow grasslands." 8 This perspective is absent from the standard view of postwar international politics that sees bipolarity as producing high conflict between the superpowers. Since the United States and the Soviet Union were the only states that could menace each other, they naturally became fearful and hostile, mobilizing many resources against each other. There is certainly a great deal to this, but the causal arrow runs the other way as well -the fears and hostility of the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to making them superpowers and generating the contours of bipolarity. Central to bipolarity was the willingness of the two superpowers to devote extensive resources to foreign and security policy. It was not only their size that elevated them over the others, but the efforts they made, which grew out of their foreign policy aims and perceptions. These, in turn, often heightened mutual hostility and thus called up sustained if not increased resources.
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Individuals similarly shape the environments to which they will later respond. What appears at first glance to be a fairly standard reaction to a situation with relatively little role for individual variation or choice may actually be interestingly different, as Lewis Anthony Dexter saw so perceptively in his studies of Congress:
A congressman very largely gets back what he puts out. In his limited time, he associates more with some kinds of people than with others, listens to some kinds of messages more than to others, and as a result hears from some kinds of people more than from others. He controls what he hears both by his attention and by his attitudes. He makes the world to which he thinks he is responding. Congressmen, indeed, do respond to pressures, but they generate the pressures they feel. 9 Robert McNamara complains about how he was misled by faulty military reporting in Vietnam but similarly fails to consider whether his style and pressure might have contributed to what he was being told.
10
Lawrence Tribe more perceptively argues that recent Supreme Court decisions that deny the appropriateness of judicial remedies for "private" wrongs similarly err in neglecting the role of laws, courts, and the state in generating the forces that brought about the problems.
11 Cunning actors understand these dynamics and may be able to manipulate their environments so that they enable or require actions that will reach previously inaccessible goals. 12 Here, as in much of political and social life, forces interact in ways that make it extremely difficult to separate out their weights or even to label one a cause and the other an effect. A lack of sensitivity to these processes has marred the field of evolutionary psychology (what used to be called sociobiology), which is based on the commonsense claim that human nature must reflect the psychological propensities and facilities that over the eons of human prehistory contributed to mate selection and offspring propagation and so spread by natural selection. Many of those who reject this view argue that human culture is so strong that it shapes or overwhelms much of the common evolutionary inheritance. But the perspective here implies that it is misleading to talk about the relative strengths of environment and heredity because of two kinds of interactions. First, the impact of heredity may be quite different depending on the environment. Not only can it matter more or less depending on the environment, but the direction of the impact as well as its magnitude can be different depending on the environment. Second, there is an important circularity because the social as well as the physical environment can strongly influence what traits are selected for. This is even -or perhaps especially -true for mate selection because a trait that leads to leaving more offspring if some social arrangements prevail can lead to fewer under other conditions. Thus it makes no sense to talk of a culture-free selection effect or to try to apportion the influence of culture and natural selection on human nature.
NON-LINEARITIES AND TIMING
The importance of interactions means that the common habit of seeing the impact of variables as additive can be misleading: the effect of A and B together is very different from the effect that A would have in isolation added to the impact of B alone. It is often said that the international system will be unstable if several of the major participants seek to greatly increase their power. The image here is of adding up the amount of national hostility or bilateral conflicts in order to arrive at the aggressiveness in the entire system. But theories of balance of power argue that one state's desire to expand can check the ambitions of other similarly-inclined states. In parallel, many national constitutions, perhaps most obviously the American, are designed to produce moderate government through the clash of interests of different parts of the society and government. Stability and restraint at the level of the system occur not in spite of ambition and conflict but because of them. Thinking in terms of additive operations implies that a given increment of one factor will have the same effect no matter when it is applied. but many interactions are non-linear. 13 Changes in the output of a system are often disproportionate to changes in the input; the impact of one factor can be greater or less depending on the amount of another factor that is present. Sometimes a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work but then further increments matter little as the law of diminishing returns sets in. In other cases, little impact will occur until some critical point has been passed. To take a classic example from military affairs, Clausewitz noted that:
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The scale of a victory does not increase simply at a rate commensurate with the increase in size of the defeated armies, but progressively. The outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength (through desertions or abandonment of weapons in a retreat), which is echoed in loss of morale; the other two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other. 14 These possibilities complicate the practice as well as the study of public policy. It would be nice if we could determine the effect of some policy by adopting a small dose and extrapolating to what would happen if the scale were increased, but we cannot.
Additivity is also defeated by the importance of timing, as Pierson stresses. 15 The impact of a variable or an event can be strongly influenced by exactly when it appears. Sometimes two events occur at about the same time, producing a much larger impact than would have otherwise been the case. Thus, at the end of July 1914, it was particularly unfortunate that Kaiser Wilhelm received a plea from the British not to call his troops to the colors just after he heard that the Russians were mobilizing. Under other circumstances, the British appeal might have produced moderation; coming right after the news from Russia, it had the opposite effect as the Kaiser concluded that these two states were engaging in collusion and deception. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 would have deeply upset the United States in any case, but coming on the heels of the Iranian revolution and what was seen as dangerous Soviet adventures in Africa, the impact was much greater.
In cases like these the effect of the two events is multiplicative. But in multiplication it does not matter which number comes first, and in interaction it often does. In international politics, the influence of nuclear weapons on the rivalry between two countries could be different if these weapons are developed in the early stages of the antagonistic relationship, as was the case in the cold war, than if they are added to a long-running rivalry, as is the case on the Indian subcontinent. To take a more general question, in international bargaining both threats and promises are deployed, but the results may be quite sensitive to the order in which they are made. When the adversary believes that the state is likely to back down if sufficient pressure is applied, beginning by being conciliatory and resorting to threats only when this approach fails is likely to produce an eventual choice between drastic retreat and war as the initial concessions harden the adversary's view of the state as lacking resolve. In this case, effective bargaining requires that threats be made first in order to convince the adversary that it cannot achieve all that it wants and that some sort of compromise is necessary. Once the adversary has come to this conclusion, rewards and conciliation are likely to be effective and necessary. On the other hand, if the states are locked into a spiral of unnecessary conflict based on fear and misperception, early reassurances and concessions may be highly valuable in changing the atmosphere, with harder bargaining usefully employed in the later stages.
Timing matters in other ways as well. A strong shock can change the system and establish patterns that are difficult to dislodge. Attitudes, expectations, incentives, and organizations once established will not be altered by events that would have had significant impact at an earlier stage. Borrowing the notion of "punctuated equilibrium" propounded by Niles Eldridge and Stephen Jay Gould, political scientists have argued that much political change proceeds by fits and starts, with disturbances such as revolutions and wars breaking an old pattern and establishing a new one that will perpetuate itself in the face of ordinary disturbances.
16 Steady and gradual change is then seen as unusual. Indeed, political scientists discovered this model long before the biologists: it is the pattern elucidated by V.O. Key in his classic study of realigning elections. 17 The argument, long a staple of American politics but now subject to severe doubts because of the events of the last two decades and reexamination of American history, is that individuals' party identification, the social cleavages represented by parties, and the relative dominance of one party over another change only in very unusual elections and maintain themselves in the normal course of events, which they partly shape.
Similar notions are part of common understanding of politics and social life. People talk about the importance of the "formative stage" of a person, policy, or regime, and politicians debate timing and ask themselves when an intervention will have disproportionate impact and when even strong actions will do very little. Thus Secretary of State Dean Acheson's preference for "letting the dust settle" after the Chinese civil war implied that this was not a stage at which the United States could have any useful impact. Although it now seems that Acheson was correct, others felt that, to the contrary, this was a crucial time at which America could exert great influence: Republicans claimed that strong opposition to the new regime would undermine it and many on the left believed that overtures would set relations aright.
HISTORY MATTERS
Pierson's theme is that history matters. Although few would disagree, many forms of analysis ignore this perspective or fail to grasp its implications. To start with, we often lose sight of the fact that some processes are irreversible -that history cannot be wound back. Most game theory assumes repeated plays of a game, but the playing and outcome of one interaction is likely to change the next one by altering the pay-offs and the actors' expectations. if not their goals. An interesting case is American relations with Iraq. We now take for granted that the United States cannot live with Saddam Hussein. Many resources are devoted to containing or, better yet, overthrowing him and the idea of establishing better relations would be met with ridicule. This stance may seem selfexplanatory in light of his invasion of Kuwait and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. But, leaving aside the questionable assumption that anyone who replaces Saddam Hussein would be an improvement, we should see that the Gulf War itself irrevocably changed relations between the United States and Iraq. Before the war as after it, Saddam was a ruthless oppressor at home who sought aggrandizement abroad. Nevertheless, the United States supported Iraq. Saddam's regime and aspirations, and even the American understanding of them, did not change. Rather the war itself changed the relations. American prestige -or at least George Bush's prestige -became implicated in removing Saddam from office and the United States came to see him as beyond influence. Furthermore, immediately after the war, the United States sponsored Kurdish autonomy to undermine Saddam. But while it soon became clear that this instrument was insufficient for the objective, the United States could not readily withdraw its protection and so created an enormous barrier to any attempt to achieve a rapprochement with the central government. (Indeed, this will be a grave problem for American-Iraqi relations when Saddam finally departs from the scene.) Obligations, once assumed, cannot readily be dropped.
Much bargaining theory has been built on the related point that making a commitment increases the costs that the actor will pay if she backs down and thereby gives her a bargaining advantage, albeit at significant risk. 18 The very point of making a commitment is that escaping from it is difficult or costly. If you could simply reverse the action and return to the status quo ante, then you could not commit yourself; irreversibility is the essence of a commitment.
Even when not done as a bargaining tactic, staking out a position makes it hard to change. This behavior creates or modifies interest rather than simply reflecting it; states take a number of positions now because they have taken them in the past. The strong Japanese claim to the four "Northern Islands" occupied by the Soviets after World War II provides an example. The position was developed when there was little chance of productive negotiations and was the product of tactical considerations rather than tradition, logic, or domestic pressures. But once established, it took on symbolic value and could not readily be altered.
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Irreversible changes can confound traditional ways of measuring the impact of independent variables because the removal of the cause does not lead to the ending of the effect. Thus, it is frequently argued that we know that the naval race between Germany and Britain was not a significant cause of World War I because Germany had conceded defeat by 1912 and "there were strong arguments on both sides for a naval agreement." 20 But this way of thinking misses the role of the German naval program in leading many in Britain to see Germany as dangerously ambitious, an image that would not disappear with the end of the challenge. In a related way, the series of crises in the decade that preceded 1914 were an important cause of the war. Political scientists often ask why the earlier crises did not lead to war while the later one did. This question, although important, masks the historical processes by which each crisis fed the next and made people ready for war. As David Herrmann and David Stevenson demonstrate, the crises and related salience of arms competition militarized the civilian leaders by making them much more aware of the military aspects of crises, increasing their concern with windows of danger and opportunity, and heightening expectations of war. 21 These developments were cumulative and difficult to reverse: even an easing of tensions would not return European decision-makers to their earlier cast of mind.
We perhaps still fail to appreciate the extent to which people can be shaped and trapped by their own decisions and others' responses. Some behaviors appear to be the only reasonable reaction to the immediate stimulus, distracting us from the role of the earlier and perhaps more problematic decisions that brought the actor and the situation to this point. 22 For example, by the end of 1941 the conflict between American and Japanese objectives was so great that war was almost inevitable. What may not have been inevitable, however, were the previous policies and actions that generated this deadlock. More recently, many observers have looked at the considerations that led President Clinton to authorize all-out participation in the efforts to settle the Bosnian conflict, including the approval of a large American peacekeeping force. But less attention has been paid to the fact that Clinton was pushed to act in part by his belated discovery that he had already -without much thought or attention -promised to dispatch American ground troops to Bosnia if this was necessary to extricate the French and British forces. Being committed to risking American lives and his own domestic popularity for an unimpressive foreign policy goal gave him reason to run risks in order to achieve something more worthwhile.
23
More subtle psychology can also be involved. We usually think that people act on the basis of their goals and beliefs about the world. They often do, but the causal arrow can run in the opposite direction as well because people are prone to infer their own beliefs and preferences from their behavior. Just as we ask why others acted as they did, so we try to make sense of our own behavior, which often arises out of temporary pressures, conjunctures of events, and random impulses. But such explanations are psychologically unsatisfactory, whether they are applied to others or ourselves. So we look for more deeply-rooted sources of action that give greater meaning to our past behavior. Furthermore, we project greater consistency for the future, which is why the process is important: people sometimes behave on the basis of their perceptions of why they acted as they did in the past. In Deborah Larson's account, this is how the policy of containment evolved. 24 Initially, Truman and his colleagues improvised their responses to specific Soviet moves. The doctrine of containment with its well-defined image of Soviet intentions and rigid prescriptions of how the United States should behave followed rather than preceded many of what came to be seen as its most significant components, such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and took on the nature of a blueprint only as policy-makers read into their previous behavior a high degree of coherence that told them how to act in the future.
The impact of history has implications for methodology as well. In the study of international politics perhaps more than in the study of domestic politics, we compare situations that are judged the same on all dimensions except for one in order to see how that one factor influences the outcomes. It is hard to imagine our field without this approach, which can either use case studies or large data sets. But there is a reason why it makes historians uncomfortable: it is not designed to catch the influence of one event on later ones. Two cases may look very much alike to the scholar, but it is not trivial that the later one occurred later. For example, if we find that actors were conciliatory in one case but belligerent in another, the reason may not be differences in the situation, but the lessons learned from the earlier interaction.
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Another use of the comparative method is to study the rounds of negotiations, looking for the differences that explain why some failed and another succeeded. But some may have succeeded because the earlier ones had failed. Learning is only part of the explanation. Actors often start with maximum demands in order to impress various audiences. To agree without having first deadlocked may be a failure in the eyes of many, just as it does not seem right to accept the first bid on one's property or perhaps the first proposal of marriage. Remarking on the bitter and apparently fruitless talks between Syria and Israel under the auspices of the years. A prenegotiation phase was required before a real negotiation could begin. The contradictory versions of the past had to be confronted and the legacy of grievances unburdened before a rational negotiation and quest for settlement began. 26
FEEDBACK AND TURNING POINTS
Some of the impact of history is caught in the idea of "turning points" that push the story into a different direction. I think the Korean War qualifies. Before the North Korean attack, American defense budgets were low, NATO was a piece of paper, American relations with the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) were not hopelessly embittered, and American commitments to countries outside Europe were limited. Korea changed all of that and established many of the familiar characteristics of the Cold War: high American defense spending, a large army in Western Europe supported by a well developed organization; deep hostility between the United States and the PRC; American defense commitments throughout the globe. 27 If this argument is correct, many of the most salient features of the Cold War cannot be attributed to the structure of the international system alone; events determined structure as much as they were determined by it.
Here and in other cases one can argue that the specific events were occasions rather than causes. When asked about the influence of the Viet Cong attack on Pleiku on the American decision to start bombing North Vietnam, McGeorge Bundy replied that "Pleikus are streetcars" -if you are waiting for one, it will come along. 28 To return to the previous case, many American decision-makers welcomed the North Korean attack because it allowed them to carry out their favored policies. This does not mean that they would have been able to act on their wishes in the absence of the event, however. Bundy is correct that there were many occasions that could have substituted for Pleiku, but even with Stalin's overreaching there were few likely events that would have served the same function as the Korean War.
Korea was a single sharp event with major longterm consequences. Perhaps more common are processes of positive feedback by which small events or changes set off self-reinforcing dynamics. In these circumstances, "effect becomes cause." 29 Pierson has discussed these dynamics mainly in comparative politics and I just want to say that they can be found throughout political and social life. 30 Indeed, Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that the basic configuration of wealth and power in the international system have come about not through the operation of deep and fundamental differences among areas of the world but rather by small and almost accidental disparities in the early modern period that allowed Western Europe to grow increasingly strong and powerful while keeping states on the periphery of the international system weak. 31 History could have come out very differently; the states that are now in the first rank are not necessarily inherently superior to the others. A narrower version of this argument was made by E.J. Hobsbawn when he showed that by being the first country to build a textile industry Great Britain dominated the world market, thereby not only fueling Britain's industrial revolution but also inhibiting development in other states. 32 In the political arena, the domino theory also foresees powerful positive feedback. Although accretions of physical power are important, in the nuclear era more crucial are actors' views of each other's resolve that greatly amplify victories and defeats of very little intrinsic importance. 33 Positive feedback characterizes many other areas of international politics: migration flows, imperial expansion, regional integration, and the adoption of norms to name just a few. Even when the initial causes are not small, they are not sufficient to explain why and how the phenomena grow and spread. This is not to say that positive feedback dominates the world. If it did, there would be no stability. Negative feedback plays a large role (for example, the balance of power), and important feedbacks can be neither stabiliz-
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26. Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 42. Rabinovich's account also makes clear that the success or failure of negotiations that are occurring simultaneously may not be independent, which means that standard comparative analysis can be misleading. During the first Clinton administration, the United States was much more deeply involved in the negotiations between Israel and Syria than between Israel and Jordan and Israel and the PLO. The first negotiation failed and the other two succeeded: the obvious inference would be that the American role had a negative impact. But in fact all three outcomes were inter-related. Prime Minister Rabin was committed to seeing that some of the negotiations succeeded and it mattered less to him which one moved forward first. The American commitment to the Israeli-Syrian talks increased the pressure on Israel to show its desire for peace and so increased the opportunity for the PLO and Jordan.
27. This paragraph is based on Robert Jervis, " ing nor destabilizing, but rather move the system in different directions. One of the important tasks of social science is to try to determine what kind of feedback will characterize a given situation. Actors similarly have to make such estimates and many policy debates center not on the immediate consequences of various courses of action but rather on the political dynamics that will be set in motion and the longterm consequences that will ensue. This means that not only are timing and sequencing important in determining political outcomes, but peoples' beliefs about timing and sequencing (perhaps learned from scholars) are part of the story. Self-fulfilling and selfdenying prophesies are fascinating and insufficiently appreciated parts of politics and social life.
